We implement a specific protocol for bit exchange among card-playing agents in three different state-of-the-art epistemic model checkers and compare the results.
gets the last card. The 'problem' of the Russian Cards problem is to find protocols that allow sender and receiver to learn each other's hand of cards, without the eavesdropper being able to learn that. In [17] , protocols of length two are presented that solve it. Protocols of length greater than two are investigated in [18] .
In such card protocols, the required postconditions are not always clear or not easy to verify, publicly known protocol features may involve fairly complex nested dynamic epistemic formulas, and enumeration of all possible protocols is an issue as well. For all that, model checkers are promising tools.
Such explorations have been partially carried out for the Russian cards problem in [21] : epistemic properties of the scenario are translated into (linear time) LTL, and then verified using the model checker SPIN. A deal of cards together with a number of announcements corresponds to a time line, not unlike the modeling in MCK presented in this paper. Uncertainty of the agents is represented by exploiting local propositions proposed in [4] , see also [14] .
In this contribution, we verify protocol properties in the epistemic model checkers MCK [7] , DEMO [19] and MCMAS [12] . We have selected one specific Russian Cards protocol, the 'five hand protocol', implemented it in these quite different dedicated 'epistemic' model checkers, and verified its relevant properties. This involved reinterpreting dynamic epistemic concepts in temporal epistemic terms; this theoretical exercise was carried out successfully and increased our understanding of dynamic epistemic features. All three implementations were carried out within a reasonable development time and all were successful. Some additional Russian Cards protocol features, in particular for protocols of length greater than two, have been kept outside this comparison. Also, incorrect protocols (such as for non-solutions of the Russian Cards problem) can be easily shown to be so by establishing failure of (commonly known or other) epistemic conditions. This only requires (almost) trivial changes in the scripts presented below for a correct protocol.
In Section 2 we present the Russian Cards problem. Sections 3 to 5 are dedicated to the implementation of the 'five hands' protocol for the Russian Cards problem in the model checkers, respectively, MCK, DEMO, and MCMAS. Section 6 compares the results. The MCK, DEMO, and MCMAS input scripts can be found on www.cs.otago.ac.nz/staffpriv/hans/aoard/. 1 
Russian Cards
From a pack of seven known cards two players each draw three cards and a third player gets the remaining card. How can the players with three cards openly inform each other about their cards, without the third player learning from any of their cards who holds it?
This 'Russian Cards' problem originated at the Moscow Math Olympiad 2000. Call the players Anne, Bill and Cath, and the cards 0, ..., 6, and suppose Anne holds {0, 1, 2}, Bill {3, 4, 5}, and Cath card 6. For the hand of cards {0, 1, 2}, write 012 instead, for the card deal, write 012.345.6, etc. Assume from now on that 012.345.6 is the actual card deal. All announcements must be public and truthful. There are not many things Anne can safely say. Obviously, she cannot say "I have 0 or 6," because then Cath learns that Anne has 0. But Anne can also not say "I have 0 or 3," because Anne does not know if Cath has 3 or another card, and if Cath had card 3, she would have learnt that Anne has card 0. But Anne can also not say "I have 0 or 1." Even though Anne holds both 0 and 1, so that she does not appear to risk that Cath eliminates either card and thus gains knowledge about single card ownership (weaker knowledge, about alternatives, is allowed), Cath knows that Anne will not say anything from which Cath may learn her cards. And thus Cath can conclude that Anne will only say "I have 0 or 1" if she actually holds both 0 and 1. And in that way Cath learns two cards at once! The apparent contradiction between Cath not knowing and Cath knowing is not really there, because these observations are about different information states: it is merely the case that announcements may induce further updates that contain yet other information.
Whenever after Anne's announcement it is (at least) not common knowledge to Anne, Bill, and Cath, that Cath remains ignorant of any of Anne's or Bill's cards, this may be informative to Cath after all. A typical example is when Anne says that she either holds 012 or not any of those cards, after which Bill says that Cath holds card 6. For details, see [17] . Indeed, a solution requirement is that Cath's ignorance remains public knowledge after any announcement. Such announcements are called safe.
A solution to the Russian Cards problem is a sequence of safe announcements after which it is commonly known to Anne and Bill (not necessarily including Cath) that Anne knows Bill's hand and Bill knows Anne's hand. This (instance of a) five hand protocol is a solution:
Anne says "My hand of cards is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, 246," after which Bill says "Cath has card 6."
Note that Bill's announcement is equivalent to "My hand of cards is one of 345, 125, 024." After this sequence, it is even publicly known that Anne knows Bill's hand and Bill knows Anne's hand. If we extend Anne's announcement with one more hand, namely 245, and if it is public knowledge that the protocols used by Anne and Bill are of finite length (so may consist of more than two announcements), then it is 'merely' common knowledge to Anne and Bill that they know each other's hand, but (disregarding further analysis) Cath considers it possible that they do not know each other's hand of cards. This is a useful security feature for Anne and Bill, as Cath plays the role of the eavesdropper. A further postcondition is that all safe announcements by Anne ensure at least one safe response from Bill, and vice versa. This recursive requirement results in a more complex condition. See [18] .
Public announcement logic
The Russian Cards problem can be modelled in public announcement logic with common knowledge. We give a concise overview of the language and its semantics.
Given are a set of agents N and a set of atoms P . An epistemic model M = S, ∼, V consists of a domain S of (factual) states (or 'worlds'), accessibility ∼ : N → P(S × S), and a valuation V : P → P(S). For s ∈ S, (M, s) is an epistemic state. For ∼ (n) we write ∼ n , and for V (p) we write V p . So, access ∼ can be seen as a set of equivalence relations ∼ n , and V as a set of valuations V p . For ( n∈G ∼ n ) * , write ∼ G : this is access to interpret common knowledge for group G.
The language of public announcements is inductively defined as
where p ∈ P , n ∈ N , and G ⊆ N are arbitrary. For K n ϕ, read 'agent n knows formula ϕ'. For C G ϕ, read 'group of agents G commonly know formula ϕ'. For [ϕ]ψ, read 'after public announcement of ϕ, formula ψ (is true)'. The effect of the public announcement of ϕ is the restriction of the epistemic state to all worlds where ϕ holds. So, 'announce ϕ' can be seen as an information state transformer, with a corresponding dynamic modal operator [ϕ] .
The semantics is as follows. Given is an epistemic model
In other words: the model M |ϕ is the model M restricted to all the states where ϕ holds, including access between states. Formula ϕ is valid on model M , notation M |= ϕ, if and only if for all states s in the domain of M : M, s |= ϕ. Formula ϕ is valid, notation |= ϕ, if and only if for all models M : M |= ϕ.
We now model the Russian Cards problem in this logic. Given a stack of known cards and some players, the players blindly draw some cards from the stack. In a state where cards are dealt in that way, but where no game actions of whatever kind have been done, it is commonly known what the cards are, that they are all different, how many cards each player holds, and that players only know their own cards. From the last it follows that two deals are the same for an agent, if she holds the same cards in both, and if all players hold the same number of cards in both. This induces an equivalence relation on deals.
An epistemic model (Rus, 012.345.6) for the deal 012.345.6 that we investigate, encodes the knowledge of the players Anne, Bill and Cath (a, b, c) in this card deal. It consists of For each player, access between states is induced by the equivalence above, for example, 012.345.6 ∼ a 012.346.5 says that Anne cannot tell these two card deals apart (as her hand is 012 in both). Facts about card ownership written as q n , for 'card q is held by player n'. The valuation V 0a of fact 0 a (Anne holds card 0) consists of all 60 deals where 0 occurs in Anne's hand, etc.
After a sequence of announcements that is a solution of the Russian Cards problem, it should hold that Anne knows Bill's cards, that Bill knows Anne's cards, and that Cath doesn't know any of Anne's or Bill's cards:
We suggested in the previous section that these conditions are too weak. This can be exemplified by the observation that, e.g.,
After Anne says that her hand is 012 or that she does not hold any of those cards, c ignorant is true, but a further update with that (in other words: when Cath can assume that this is true) makes Cath learn some of Anne's cards, so that c ignorant is false. The actually required postconditions avoiding such complications are: after every announcement of an executed protocol, it is publicly known that Cath is ignorant, and after the execution of the entire protocol it is commonly known to Anne and Bill that: Anne knows that Bill knows her hand of cards, and Bill knows that Anne knows his hand of cards. Also using that C ab (K b a knows bs ∧ K a b knows as) is equivalent to C ab (a knows bs ∧ b knows as) this is formalized as C ab (a knows bs ∧ b knows as)
Concerning protocols: when Anne announces 'ϕ', this should be interpreted as 'K a ϕ' given that she knows what she says, and even as '
given her intention, and beyond that even as '
given that her intention is public. One can then show that
So in this case the intention is indeed realized, unlike above: the announcement is safe. We ignore the further complication that safe announcements require safe responses in this submission. The solution given in Section 2 consists of the successive announcements a announce := 012 a ∨ 034 a ∨ 056 a ∨ 135 a ∨ 246 a b announce := 6 c 3 Model Checker MCK MCK, for 'Model Checking Knowledge', is a prototype model checker for temporal and knowledge specifications, developed by Peter Gammie and Ron van der Meyden [7] . The overall setup supposes a number of agents acting in an environment, by temporal development. This is modelled by an interpreted system where agents perform actions according to a protocol. Actions and the environment may be only partially observable at each instant in time. Different approaches to the temporal and epistemic interaction and development are implemented. Knowledge may be based on current observations only, on current observations and clock value, and on the history of all observations and clock value. The last corresponds to synchronous perfect recall. We have used that approach. In the temporal dimension, the specification formulas may describe the evolution of the system along a single computation, i.e., using linear time temporal logic (LTL), or they may describe the branching structure of all possible computations, i.e, using branching time or computation tree logic (CTL). We have used LTL. See www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~mck/ for more information.
Russian Cards in MCK In MCK, we have to reinterpret the dynamic epistemics of Section 2 in temporal epistemic terms. In a program rus.mck we successively introduce environmental variables and initialize those; we create three agents A, B, and C with corresponding protocols "anne", "bill" and "cath"; a main part of the program specifies the (temporal) transitions, induced by card dealing and the announcements, that relate different information states for these players; finally rus.mck contains a part with various to be verified properties of the timelines created.
A hand of cards of an agent is encoded by a list of seven booleans, for example a hand : Bool [7] specifies for all of the cards 0, ..., 6 whether they are held by Anne or not, such that anne cards[0] is true when Anne holds card 0, etc. Initially, such variables are set to false.
Agent A, for Anne, is created by agent A "anne" (a_hand, a_announce, b_announce, stage)
The name of the agent is A. It uses protocol "anne". It can interact with, and potentially observe the variables between parentheses. The first of those is, obviously, only observable by Anne, the others will reappear in the other agent definitions, as they are publicly observable. The variable stage is the 'clock tick'. The transitions part of rus.mck specify what happens in different stages of the execution of the protocol. We distinguish stages (clock ticks) 0, 1, 2, and 3. In stage 0 the cards are dealt to the players, in the order 0, ..., 6. We show it up to the dealing of card 0. In stage 1, Anne announces that her hands is one of 012, 034, 056, 135, and 246. This is done indirectly by executing the protocol "anne", that contains a condition corresponding to these five deals, which causes the action Announce to be executed. This then results in the atom a announce becoming true.
stage == 1 /\ A.Announce -> a_announce := True
In stage 2, Bill announces that Cath holds card 6. Alternatively, one can model that Bill announces Cath's card -whatever it is. Bill's announcement is by way of an action B.Announce, and results in the variable b announce to become true. This is the transition to stage 3, the final stage. We can imagine the whole system to consist of 140 different runs. Whether variables a announce and b announce are true in stage 2 and stage 3, respectively, depends on the deal in that run.
The protocol for Anne is The 'begin-end' part of this protocol specifies for each of the stages 0, 1, and 2 what happens in that stage. In stage 0 nothing happens: skip. In stage 1, the action Announcethat is, whatever is found between << and >> -is executed. Actually, the value or instance of cards for Anne is a cards; see above, where Anne is created. Alternatively to five actual hands, a much longer protocol creates five arbitrary hands of cards based on Anne's actual hand. Nothing is specified for stage 2: this is therefore skip again by default. Bill has a similar protocol but his protocol starts with skip ; skip, as his announcement is in stage 2. And Cath does not act at all, which carries the protocol skip ; skip ; skip.
The knowledge of the agents evolves with every stage, via the agents' limited access to the environment. Initially, they only observe their own hand of cards, and Anne's and Bill's public announcement is accessed by all agents. Anne cannot distinguish two states iff her observations are the same in those states. For example, in stage 1 Anne cannot distinguish the timelines for deals 012.345.6 and 012.346.5, because: both have the same a hand values (for all seven variables), a announce is true in both cases, and b announce is false is both cases. But in stage 3, Anne can distinguish these timelines, since b announce is true for the former and false for the latter.
A final part of rus.mck lists various temporal epistemic properties to be checked. For example, we want to verify that Rus, 012.345.6 |= [a announce][b announce]C ab a knows bs. The current version (0.2.0) of MCK does not support common knowledge operators for specification in the perfect recall module. Therefore we verify instead that in stage 3, a knows bs is valid in the model. This corresponds to Rus|a announce|b announce |= a knows bs which ensures that Rus|a announce|b announce, 012.345.6 |= C abc a knows bs. And in this specific model C ab a knows bs ↔ C abc a knows bs is also true. The part spec spr xn means that we are using the perfect recall module of MCK, and X 3 is the triple 'next state' temporal operator, counting from stage 0. Therefore, the formula bound by the operator is checked in stage 3. Similarly, other properties of the five hands protocol are verified.
Model Checker DEMO
The tool DEMO is developed by Jan van Eijck [19] . DEMO is short for Dynamic Epistemic MOdelling. It allows modelling epistemic updates, graphical display of Kripke structures involved (i.e., epistemic or state models, and action models that represent epistemic actions), formula evaluation in epistemic states, etc. Epistemic models are minimized under bisimulation, and action models are minimized under the (more appropriate, weaker) notion of action emulation [20] . DEMO is written in the functional programming language Haskell. See also www.cwi.nl/~jve/papers/04/demo/.
The model checker DEMO implements the dynamic epistemic logic of [2] . In this 'action model logic' the global state of the multi-agent system is represented by an epistemic model (multi-agent Kripke model), and the agents' action is represented by an action model. An action model is also based on a multi-agent Kripke frame, but instead of carrying a valuation it has a precondition function which assigns a precondition to each point in the action model, which stands for an atomic action. The state change in the system is via an operation called update product. This is a restricted modal product. In this submission we restrict our attention to action models for public announcements. Such action models have a singleton domain. We refrain from details and proceed with the recursive definition of formulas in DEMO. A pointed (and singleton) action model for a public announcement is created by a function public with a precondition (formula) as argument. The update operation is specified as
Here, EpistM is an epistemic state and PoAM is a pointed action model. The update generates a new epistemic state as specified above. Formula checking is defined as isTrue :: EpistM -> Form -> Bool Its arguments are an epistemic state and a formula, and it returns a boolean value.
Russian Cards in DEMO In DEMO, one is restricted to propositional letters starting with lower case p, q and r, so we cannot write, for example, 0 a for the atomic proposition that Anne holds card 0, as in Section 2. Instead, atoms {p, . . . , p6, q, . . . , q6, r, . . . , r6} represent such atomic propositions. The name p4 -Anne holds card 4 -actually stands for Prop (P 4), etc. Instead of p0 we write, somewhat arbritrarily, p, and similarly for q and r.
The initial epistemic state rus representing the knowledge in card deal 012.345.6 is constructed as follows. A set of integers [0..139] represents the 140 different deals. Each integer is associated with seven propositional letters. The first two deals are (0,[P 0,P 1,P 2,Q 3,Q 4,Q 5,R 6]), (1,[P 0,P 1,P 2,Q 3,Q 4,Q 6,R 5])
The deal numbered 0 stands for actual deal 012.345.6. A pair of two integers is in the accessibility relation for an agent n, if that agent holds the same cards in both deals. Two such pairs for Anne are (a,0,0),(a,0,1) . DEMO assumes arbitrary accessibility relations. So, unfortunately, we have to explicitly list all pairs in the equivalence relation for each agent, as above.
Anne's public announcement a announce corresponds to the following singleton action model named anne5, which is produced by the function public.
Similarly, we have an action model billkc for Bill's announcement b announce. The postcondition that Anne knows Bill's hand of cards, a knows bs, is represented as
Similarly for b knows as and c ignorant. The epistemic state (upd (upd rus anne5) billkc) is the result of updating epistemic state (upd rus anne5) with singleton pointed action model billkc, and (upd rus anne5) was the result of updating the initial epistemic state rus with the action model representing the announcement of a announce.
Model Checker MCMAS
MCMAS presumably stands for Model Checking Multi-Agent Systems. This model checker has been developed by Franco Raimondi and Alessio Lomuscio [12] . The current version is mcmas 0.6. System descriptions and protocol properties are verified using ordered binary decision diagrams, comparable to the approach used in MCK. It extends existing obdd-based techniques for reactive systems by adding both an epistemic (ATL) and a deontic dimension to the logical language, and allowing input in terms of interpreted systems. The information changes take the usual steps: (1) the cards are revealed to the agents, (2) Anne announces a announce, and (3) Bill announces b announce. All reachable global states will be included in the next stage. An example initial global state is (annnnn, bnnnnn, cnnn, e0123456); an 'n' essentially means that the agent has no information on the value of corresponding variable, modelled by giving the variable that value n. So, bnnnnn means that Bill's local state is that he does not know his cards yet (the first three n's), that Anne has not made her announcement yet (the fourth n) and that Bill has not made his announcement yet. The above global state (annnnn, bnnnnn, cnnn, e0123456) then transits to (a012nn, b345nn, c6nn, e0123456), where each agent knows what cards it holds. Anne's a announce is then made, causing the transition to (a012tn, b345tn,c6tn, e0123456) and b announce finally results in (a012tt, b345tt,c6tt, e0123456) -this time, Bill's announcement is successful. These state transitions are specified in the program. For example, for agent Anne, the transition for step one is as follows; Lstate is the local state of (current) agent Anne, Groups of agents can be named too. This is useful when checking common knowledge. For example ABC={Anne, Bill, Cath}; gives the group consisting of Anne, Bill, and Cath the label ABC. A common knowledge formula such as C abc (0 a → K a 0 a ) is then represented as CK(ABC,a0->K(Anne,a0)). We conclude this short exposition with the postcondition C abc c ignorant that verifies that Cath remains ignorant after both announcements have been made -'!' stands for negation.
ab_d0123456 -> GCK(ABC,( ( !K(Cath,a0) and !K(Cath,b0) ) and ( !K(Cath,a1) and !K(Cath,b1) ) and ( !K(Cath,a2) and !K(Cath,b2) ) and ( !K(Cath,a3) and !K(Cath,b3) ) and ( !K(Cath,a4) and !K(Cath,b4) ) and ( !K(Cath,a5) and !K(Cath,b5) ) and ( !K(Cath,a6) and !K(Cath,b6) ) ));
Comparison
We did not compare the model checkers on their computational powers. Currently, none of our checks took more than a few minutes. Mostly, we were interested in how versatile the tools appeared to be, to implement a problem that was originally formulated in local, and dynamic epistemic, terms, into temporal epistemic terms and/or as an interpreted system. In other words, we were more than anything else interested in development time and supported functionality. Conclusions based on our experiences are extremely tentative. The fastest goal to success was implementing the Russian Cards problem in DEMO. This took about half a day, for Ji Ruan, who is an expert in DEMO. But it took Ron van der Meyden, expert in MCK, also half a day to write the initial version of the MCK implementation -though that was finished much later by Hans and Ji, non-experts in MCK. Currently, MCK does not support common knowledge (in the used module), nor epistemic preconditions, nor preconditions to temporal formulas. The last makes it impossible to have knowledge preconditions to players' announcements. Such preconditions are always epistemic, as agents only announce what they know to be true. Also, unsuccessful updates -formulas that become false because they are announced -cannot be made visible in the way they have to be checked in MCK: the analogue is a conditional formula where the antecedent is also a subformula of the temporal consequent.
On the other hand, MCK allows a very natural formalization of protocols -this is not, or less, possible in DEMO or MCMAS. The 'fully interpreted system' approach of MCMAS is very transparent, but the models that need to be built are 'very' large: (automated input of) thousands of lines of code, as opposed to (manual input of) about a hundred lines of code in MCK. More than anything, this case-study increased our insight into the state of the art in epistemic model checking, and our understanding of the theoretical issues involved in card cryptography, emerging from the need to reformulate these issues in different logics.
